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Abstract—This Innovative Practice Full Paper presents a
national case study-based analysis of the numerous dimensions
to cybersecurity education and how they are implemented and
accredited; from understanding the interaction of hardware and
software, moving from theory to practice (and vice versa), to
human factors, policy and politics (as well as other important
facets). A multitude of model curricula and recommendations
have been presented and discussed in international fora in recent
years, with varying levels of impact on education, policy and prac-
tice. This paper address three key questions: i) What is taught
and what should be taught for cybersecurity to general computer
science students; ii) Should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone
or in an integrated manner to general computer science students;
and iii) Can accreditation by national professional, statutory and
regulatory bodies enhance the provision of cybersecurity within
a body’s jurisdiction?
Evaluating how cybersecurity is taught in all aspects of
computer science is clearly a task of considerable size, one that
is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead a case study-based re-
search approach, primarily focusing on the UK, has been adopted
to evaluate the evidence of the teaching of cybersecurity within
general computer science to university-level students. Thus, in the
context of widespread international computer science/engineering
curriculum reform, what does this need to embed cybersecurity
mean more generally for institutions and educators, and how
can we teach this subject more effectively? Through this UK
case study, and by contrasting with the US, we demonstrate the
positive effect that national accreditation requirements can have,
and give some recommendations both for future research and
curriculum developments.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity, curricula, accreditation, com-
puter science education, public policy, UK
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity has increasingly been a headline feature in
the news over recent years, generally prompted by spec-
tacular breaches, from major credit reference agencies [1],
telecoms companies [2], national airlines [3], online dating
websites [4], and even between sovereign governments [5].
These major breaches have had significant impact on both
individual citizens and society in general, requiring attention
from organisations of all sizes [6]1:
“...[need to] change the culture in your organisation
around cyber security; to try to do for cyber what
has been done so successfully for health and safety,
1Former Director of GCHQ: UK equivalent of NSA.
for example, over the last ten years — to get every-
body to take it seriously; to take the risk management
process seriously and drive that down through the
organisation.”
These global cybersecurity crises have compelled academic
institutions to address the demand for educated cybersecurity
professionals [7]. As no shared framework for “cybersecurity”
as an academic discipline exists, growth has been unfocused
and largely driven by training materials, which makes it harder
to establish a common body of knowledge (for example, in
the UK, the CyBOK project [8] is still a work in progress).
An international perspective is harder still, as different nations
use different criteria to define local needs [9]. As a result,
new programmes entering this space are free to conceptualise,
design, package and market their initiatives, as there is no
globally accepted reference model for cybersecurity to allow
employers or students to understand the extent or ambition of
a given cybersecurity program [10], [11].
With this significant economic and societal focus on cyber-
security, there are calls for formal education – school-level as
well as post-compulsory – to respond to this situation, at the
individual level and via recommended curricula [12], [13] and
professional accreditation requirements [14]. This is further
reinforced by a wider focus on digital skills and computer
science education reform, especially across the nations of the
UK [15], [16], [17].
A recent ACM working group, as part of the Innovation
and Technology in Computer Science Education (ITiCSE)
conference series [11], has been capturing global perspectives
on cybersecurity education, but has yet to report its full
findings. An aim of the ITiCSE working group is to develop a
taxonomy for approaches to cybersecurity education, resulting
in improved standards and goals for many different types of
cybersecurity programmes; a further aim is to “catalog existing
[. . . ] knowledge materials”, but there is no mention of any
quality control over these. Nevertheless, it is one thing to
write national curricula, specifications and requirements, and
another thing to deliver appropriate and relevant education and
skills; furthermore, this paper asks how well this is done in
practice.
II. CYBERSECURITY: FOR ALL, OR FOR SPECIALISTS?
In one sense, this title is a false dichotomy: there is a
serious need for cybersecurity specialists (estimates vary, but
are always large), but also all in IT need to know some
cybersecurity – thus, there is a case for depth as well as
breadth [18], [19]. This is not a new concern: see [20] for
concerns over five years ago, but it is a growing one.
This need to build knowledge, skills and capacity in the
area of cybersecurity has also led to the establishment of
a number of strategic policy initiatives from a number of
national governments, for example the UK’s Cyber Security
Strategy [21] (as well as the setting up of the UK National
Cyber Security Centre, with increased scrutiny of what this
means for the UK’s critical national infrastructure [22]; also
initiatives such as Cyber Essentials2), the EU Cybersecurity
Act [23] (which reinforces the mandate of the EU Agency
for Cybersecurity – ENISA – the European Union Agency
for Network and Information and Security), or the National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) in the USA [24].
The teaching of cybersecurity in higher education pre-dates
these initiatives and there has been recognition of the need
for the inclusion of cybersecurity as part of the discipline of
computer science for a number of years [25], [9]. There have
been a number of international initiatives to define curricula
to support this, for example the ACM Computer Science
Curricula Recommendations [26, which added “Information
Assurance and Security” for the first time], as well as for
specialised cybersecurity degree programmes [27]. There has
been a debate as to whether cybersecurity is distinct discipline
from computer science [7]. The consensus increasingly is that
cybersecurity is both a discipline in its own right and that
cybersecurity should be taught within computer science and
related degrees. Recent evolution of cybersecurity education
shows that it has begun to take shape as a true academic
perspective, as opposed to simply being a training domain
for certain specialised jobs. More recent work presents cyber-
security as a “meta-discipline”; that is, cybersecurity should
be used as an aggregate label for a wide variety of similar
disciplines, much in the same way that the terms “engineering”
and “computing” are commonly used [28].
Further to the substantial computer science and digital skills
curriculum reform across the UK [29], [15], [17], the question
is raised whether cybersecurity should be formally taught in
schools, as part of a compulsory education. While aspects
of “e-safety” and principles of protecting personal data are
increasingly visible in formal curricula [30], the majority
of UK schoolchildren’s exposure to cybersecurity skills is
through national extra-curricular competitions, for example
Cyber Security Challenge UK3. The Institute of Coding [31],
a £40m+ initiative by the UK Government to transform the
digital skills profile of the country – but primarily focused on
2Cyber Essentials is a UK Government-backed, industry-supported scheme
to help organisations protect themselves against common online threats: https:
//www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov.uk
3https://www.cybersecuritychallenge.org.uk
university graduates – does indeed mention cybersecurity, but
merely as a sub-item in one work package.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
There are various levels of specialism at which cybersecurity
education can be addressed:
(i) The general public — this is important, but there are
many initiatives in this area, which are, rightly, largely
separated from computing education.
(ii) The generalist computer science graduate.
(iii) The generalist computer science masters graduate.
(iv) The specialist computer science graduate.
(v) The specialist computer science masters graduate.
The focus of this paper is on (ii)–(iii): the general computer
science graduate.
This paper thus focuses on three research questions:
RQ1 What cybersecurity is taught and what cybersecurity
should be taught to the general computer science stu-
dents?
RQ2 Should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone or in an
integrated manner to general computer science students?
RQ3 Can accreditation by professional, statutory and regu-
latory bodies (PSRBs) enhance the provision of cyberse-
curity within a body’s jurisdiction?
A. Research Approach
A UK-focused case study-based approach is adopted in this
project. As is common in case study-based research, many
alternative case studies could have been chosen. The cases
are illustrative rather than comprehensive in terms of the
available case studies or challenges. The cases were evaluated
to articulate the progress made and highlight opportunities for
future developments in education and practice.
The first set of cases that are considered are the current
situation in terms of recommendations from a sample of rel-
evant PSRBs, together with the published evidence regarding
compliance with these recommendations. This is followed by
the evaluation of the policy context. Together these provide a
context to the ongoing enhancement initiatives in the area of
cybersecurity education.
In order to address RQ1 and RQ2 a number of case studies
pertaining to challenges of delivering cybersecurity to under-
graduate computer science students are evaluated. Namely,
an industry problem with evident cybersecurity implications;
the current state of educational resources with respect to
cybersecurity; and the challenges evident in the UK related to
the recruitment and retention of suitably qualified academic
staff in the cyber security area.
Finally, in order to address RQ3 cases studies are evaluated
related to the challenges and successes of PSRB accreditation
of cybersecurity in undergraduate computer science in one
jurisdiction (the UK). As discussed in the current situation
section, in this jurisdiction mandating cybersecurity within
PSRB accreditation is at a reasonably mature stage.
B. Current State of Play
The ACM/IEEE-CS Joint Task Force on Computing Curric-
ula [26, p. 97] takes a distinct view on the Knowledge Areas
(KAs) related to RQ2:
The Information Assurance and Security KA is
unique among the set of KAs presented here given
the manner in which the topics are pervasive
throughout other KAs
It proposes 9 “core” hours and 63.5 distributed across the other
KAs.
Nevertheless, the situation on the ground in the USA is
different [32]:
Universities suffer shortcomings, as well. Roughly
85 of them offer undergraduate and/or graduate de-
grees in cybersecurity. There is a big catch, however.
Far more diversified computer science programs,
which attract substantially more students, don’t man-
date even one cybersecurity course.
The UK situation is distinctly different: 61% of UK courses
offer mandatory cybersecurity content, and this research was
based on web scraping [33, Table 1]. As such it represents a
lower bound since not all coverage will necessarily be clearly
articulated in publicly available documentation online.
It is at least plausible to attribute this difference to
differences in the accreditation regimes, as the exter-
nal circumstances, governmental pressures, and professional
body/learned society curricula are all similar.
UK BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT (BCS) has had
a requirement to include information security in the
curriculum since 2010, and has expected coverage of
an agreed cybersecurity syllabus since 2015 (Table I),
with the result that all accredited universities should
be compliant by 2020 (because of the five-year cycle).
More precisely, accredited degrees have been expected
to demonstrate coverage of “2.1.9 Knowledge and under-
standing of information security issues in relation to the
design, development and the use of information systems”
[14, p. 30] since 2010 with an enhanced cybersecurity
related definition of what this entails since 2015 [14,
p. 17–18].
US ACM has equally had cybersecurity (“Information As-
surance and Security” — IAS) in the curriculum since
2013 [26], but it is not the accrediting body. ABET
is, and is requiring IAS with effect from the 2019-20
cycle (self-study reports due 1 July 2019): more precisely
[34, Table 3] “The computing topics must include: . . .
Principles and practices for secure computing. . . ”. This
should mean that all accredited universities should be
compliant by 2025 (because of the six-year cycle).
IV. CHALLENGES: RQ1 AND RQ2
The ACM Computer Science Curricula Recommenda-
tions [26] states three Tier-1 and six Tier-2 hours for “In-
formation Assurance and Security”, but this is the “IAS-only”
topics, and ACM expects 32 Tier-1 and 31.5 Tier-2 Hours for
IAS topics embedded in other Knowledge Areas.
The UK’s official body of knowledge resource, the CyBOK
project[8], has produced reference documentation for some
(as of June 2019: five final, seven for comment, out of
a planned total of 19) knowledge areas, which are useful
references for the experienced educator looking for a definition
or characterisation, but a long way from being a textbook
(which is not their aim).
A. Industry Standards: PCI DSS
Is teaching cybersecurity different? Lecturing is probably
not the best way. Should we use real-life case studies (e.g.
British Airways [35]). [36] suggests that there are benefits
from teaching this discipline area in a more practical manner.
There are a number of ways a more practical manner could
be action, one would be by the inclusion of pertinent cyber-
security standards in the curricula.
The Payments Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI
DSS) [37] is one such standard. PCI DSS underpins all
processing of credit/debit cards. Nevertheless, they are very
rarely mentioned in generalist computer scientist courses. This
would not matter so much if everyone handling payments data
were sent by their employers on an effective PCI DSS course.
However, the payments business is now so spread across
websites, often run by small and medium enterprises (SME), or
non-specialists. Even larger enterprises are not immune: [35]
reports that the recent British Airways breach was caused by
a failure to adhere to PCI DSS in the website maintenance.
It is an interesting question as to whether standards such as
PCI DSS should be addressed within degree courses (clearly
degree courses can never cover all standards) or whether they
should be addressed in professional training courses. However
it appears the current situation is not ideal from the perspective
of industry (or users of systems) and the inclusion of pertinent
standards could be seen as a useful enhancement activity to the
coverage of cybersecurity within generalist computer science
courses.
B. Educational Resources
1) SQL Injection: It is 15 years since [38] wrote “All the
topics listed above should be presented in the first Database
Course”, and the first such topic was SQL injection [39], [40].
SQL injection as an attack has been around for twenty years
[41], has its own cartoon (https://xkcd.com/327/, dating back
to 2007 according to the Internet Archive) and website (http://
bobby-tables.com/). Nevertheless SQL injection is still a major
weakness: number one in the Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) Top 10 [42], and has been in the Top 10
since at least 2003. [43, the UK’s definitive reference] states “a
wide range of attack techniques for exploiting SQL injection
or script injection are known and documented.”.
Clearly such a major weakness should be well-taught. In
general it is hard to determine what is taught, but a reasonable
proxy for this is the content of recommended textbooks.
Hence [44] analysed the database textbooks used by 44 of
the top 50 computer science departments in the USA. There
were seven such books, but three books accounted for the 36
of the 44 universities. Five of the seven (30 of the 44) had no
mention of SQL injection. On the other two, the more popular
one has a seriously flawed discussion4, and the other, while
generally excellent, had a presentational problem5.
This oversight is not limited to textbooks: although
Wikipedia has an article on SQL Injection, it was not linked
from the SQL page itself.6
2) The Case of Java: A recommendation for future work
is a comprehensive survey equivalent to [44] for Java text-
books. Indeed, many such books go nowhere near security
applications. But this means that the programmer who has to
implement security is left to the documentation of the pack-
age/API being used, and to informal resources. [45] analysed
503 cybersecurity-related postings on the popular Stack over-
flow (https://stackoverflow.com) resource. 53% were about the
Spring Security framework (https://projects.spring.io/spring-
security/), dominated by authentication (45%). The discussion
[45, §4.3.1] of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) is especially
worrying. By default, Spring implicitly enables protection
against this. But all the accepted answers to CSRF-related
failures simply suggested disabling the check. There were no
negative comments about this, and indeed a typical response is
“Adding csrf().disable() solved the issue!!! I have no
idea why it was enabled by default”. As of writing (16 January
2018) there were no negative comments about this disabling
of a vital security feature.
This research was further developed by [46] (and popu-
larised in a security community in [47]). Their first finding
was:
644 out of the 1,429 inspected answer posts (45%)
are insecure, meaning that insecure suggestions
popularly exist on SO. Insecure answers dominate,
in particular, the SSL/TLS category [355 insecure
versus 150 secure, i.e. > 70%].
3) Android: A recommendation for future work is a com-
prehensive survey equivalent to [44] for Android textbooks;
[48] looked specifically at the use of resources from Stack
Overflow in Android applications. The key finding was this:
We found that 15.4% of all 1.3 million Android ap-
plications contained security-related code snippets
from Stack Overflow. Out of these 97.9% contain at
least one insecure code snippet.
4“However, the paper implies that using parameters is equivalent to using
a function to add escape characters around user input. This is incorrect, as
using parameters allows SQL statements to be pre-compiled, and prevents any
user input from being interpreted as code, while escaping user input is not
recommended as a sole defense since imperfect escape functions can easily
be subverted.” [44]
5“However, the fact that the first example should not be used is not discussed
until two pages after the example in the text, and is not mentioned at all in
the caption or on the page where the figure appears. This means a student
who is skimming the text looking for an example to modify for their own code
could simply copy the code that first appears in the example, without being
aware that this is in fact an example of what they shouldn’t do.” [44]
6Fixing this is a suggestion for future work.
Two caveats (in opposite directions) should be noted. The
labelling was conservative, in that snippets were only labelled
as insecure if that was demonstrable, and, for example, mere
use of outdated SSL/TLS was not automatically deemed
insecure. On the other hand, the insecure snippet might have
been used in a way that did not expose the insecurity.
The uncritical reading of Stack Overflow was also noted
in [49, Slide 29]. Their key recommendation [49, Slide
32] is “Improve documentation: Clarify what you can(not)
copy/paste”.
4) Agile: A recommendation for future work is a compre-
hensive survey equivalent to [44] for “Agile” textbooks. Many
authors have found disconnects between Agile practices and
secure software development: notably [50] for small projects
and [51] for large projects.
Agile’s preference for functionality over non-functional
requirements is clearly displayed in practice. [52] asked 20
student developers to imagine they were part of a team
working on creating a social networking site for our university
and to implement a password storage mechanism for this.
10 (“primed”) were explicitly told that the storage had to be
secure and 10 (“unprimed”) were not. None of the unprimed
ones implemented any security.
5) Informal Resources: The web abounds with informal
resources: tutorials and code snippets. How good are these,
and how good are people at using these? This has been looked
at by [53], This research took the top five results from Google
for six queries. Of these 30 tutorials, six had SQL injection
weaknesses, and three had Cross-Site Scripting7 weaknesses.
Searching for these fragments in PHP projects on GitHub
found 820 instances of these fragments, of which 117 were
verified manually to be vulnerable — 80% of which were
vulnerable to SQL injection. Some students clearly make use
of these resources, a recommendation of future work is to
explore and evaluate students’ (and indeed others’) use of such
informal resources.
C. Staff
It is well known that cybersecurity skills are in short
supply [9]. For example:
Research into the state of IT conducted annually
by Enterprise Strategy Group (ESG)8 has revealed
that the skills gap in information security continues
to widen and has doubled in the past five years.
In 2014, 23% of respondents to the survey stated
that their organisation had a problematic shortage
of information security skills. This had climbed to
51% at the beginning of this year. Clearly, this is
an issue which is being felt across many industries
and organisations, and is a concern which extends
beyond IT leadership into the boardroom. [54]
The ESG survey is international, but ESG have confirmed that
the UK figures are very similar.
7Number 7 in OWASP’s Top Ten [42].
8Apparently https://www.esg-global.com/research/esg-brief-2018-
cybersecurity-spending-trends.
In the UK, there is a prominence of job adverts to re-
cruit academic staff with specialisms in cybersecurity. The
demand for cybersecurity skills in industry makes it difficult
for academia to attract academics with knowledge, practical
experience, research background and academic aspirations.
As universities expand their cybersecurity provision it is not
uncommon to find multiple jobs advertised at the same time.
Recent example have included a professor of cybersecurity,
two senior academic positions and two junior academic posi-
tions in one advert. There are other examples in the UK of
cybersecurity lecturing jobs remaining unfilled for longer than
a year; there are also examples of cybersecurity subject groups
moving en masse from one university to another.
V. ACCREDITATION BY PSRBS: RQ3
In the UK as in most jurisdictions, higher education pro-
vision addresses general computer science and specialist cy-
bersecurity courses. A significant number of undergraduate
and postgraduate programmes are available in both the areas
of computer science and cybersecurity (and closely related
fields computer security, digital/computer forensics, etc). In
the UK, the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service
(UCAS) lists over 40 higher education institutions providing
undergraduate qualifications related to cybersecurity for entry
in September 2019. An even larger number of institutions
provide study opportunities related to more general com-
puter science. UCAS lists 246 provides for undergraduate
programmes related to computer science.
Accreditation has evolved to directly addresses the cyber-
security challenges in both general computer science pro-
grammes and specialist cybersecurity programmes. In the UK,
accreditation in the broad computing area is being performed
by a few different agencies. These include:
1. Not-for-Profit Organisations
Tech Partnership Degrees is a not-for-profit organisation that
provides endorsements to higher education programmes with
specific curricula elements aimed at job market requirements.
One of the curricula elements is related to cybersecurity.
Tech Partnership Degrees have a specialist scope, endorsing
programmes in the area of IT Management for Business
and Software Engineering for Business. Tech Partnership
Degrees currently endorse 14 IT Management for Business
Programmes and five Software Engineering for Business Pro-
grammes. As such, Tech Partnership Degrees currently have
limited impact upon more general computer science education
and none upon specialist cybersecurity education.
The Institute of Coding is a not-for-profit entity, led by
the University of Bath, that intends to enhance how digital
skills are developed in higher education in the UK [31].
This is likely to include cybersecurity related skills. Like the
Tech Partnership, the focus is upon job market requirements.
Additionally the Institute is looking at potentially endorsing
the demonstrable capabilities of graduates as shown by their
university studies, work experience and work placements.
Given the size of this initiative this potentially has a significant
role to play however at time of writing it is clearly a work in
progress.
2. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)
The NCSC is a UK Government organisation tasked with
enhancing the cybersecurity of the UK. The NCSC publishes
and accredits to a number of cybersecurity standards [55].
These standards are linked to the ACM recommendations for
curricula [26]. To date the major focus of NCSC accreditation
has been upon Masters degrees specialising in cybersecurity.
More recently the NCSC has also began accrediting integrative
masters programmes, undergraduate degrees in cybersecurity
and computer science degrees with a significant cybersecurity
focus [56].
Currently accredited are 15 cybersecurity MSc programmes
with a further 11 provisional accredited, 3 integrated masters
cybersecurity programmes and 1 cybersecurity Degree Pro-
gramme with a further 2 provisionally accredited. Hence the
extent of accreditation is currently reasonably limited in terms
of reach to computer science programmes. This appears to be
a positive initiative that will hopefully further develop over
time.
3. Professional Bodies/Learned Societies
BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT (BCS) and the In-
stitution of Engineering and Technology (IET) both accredit
programmes in the general area of computer science and the
more specialist area of cybersecurity discipline areas. The
accreditation provided by these institutes are underpinned
by international initiatives such as the Washington Accord9
and the Seoul Accord10. These memoranda support the in-
ternationalising of the curriculum and promote consistency
and parity in computer science education globally. These
professional bodies are also registered charities and hence have
responsibilities for public good which extends beyond short
term job market needs [57], [58]. Both the BCS and the IET
have a long history of expecting coverage of environmental
factors within the programmes they accredit. The BCS has for
a number of years been expecting significant coverage of what
it terms Legal, Ethical, Social and Professional Issues [59].
Clearly cybersecurity has been and continues to be part of
these expectations.
In recent years the BCS has evolved its accreditation prac-
tices to promote and mandate the inclusion of cybersecurity
within the programmes the body accredits. The timeline which
this process has followed in Table I.
A. Developing Expectations
Internationally the expectations regarding both the breadth
and depth of the expected cybersecurity coverage has been
the subject of much discussion, debate and analysis. Like
many governments, the UK Government has been actively
been seeking ways to address this [61], [21]. In parallel to the
work complete by the ACM [26], in the UK considerable effort
was taken to ensure industry, higher education, government
9http://www.ieagreements.org/accords/washington/.
10https://www.seoulaccord.org/.
TABLE I
TIMELINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CYBERSECURITY EXPECTATIONS
IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3) - A. Developing Ex-
pectations
UK Government Cybersecurity Strategy [21] November
2011
Three workshops of a consortium of industry,
academia and government bodies - led by CPHC and
(ISC)2 - leading to the development of Cybersecurity
learning guidelines to be embedded into BCS accred-
ited UK Computer Science and IT-related degree [60]
2013 to June
2015
UK Government report Cybersecurity Skills, Busi-
ness Perspectives and Government’s Next Steps Re-
port Released [61]
March 2014
Council of Professors and Heads of Computing
(CPHC) Identifies Cybersecurity as one the top 3
concerns in Computing
April 2014
Joint Development of White Paper from CPHC and
The International Information Systems Security Cer-
tification Consortium (ISC)2 [62]
April -
November
2014
Extended Cybersecurity Criteria included in BCS
Accreditation Guidelines [14]
June 2015
IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3) - B. What does the
BCS tell Universities?
Cybersecurity Principles Roadshow March-April
2016
IV. ACCREDITATION (RQ3) - C. Accreditation -
what progress has been made?
All visited institutions expected to be fully compliant
(BCS follow a 5-year Accreditation Cycle)
September
2020
and the relevant professional bodies collaborated on a set of
guidelines which are to the benefit of the various stakeholders
and wider society [63]. In 2013, an initiative was set up
by (ISC)2, CPHC (the representative body of UK computer
science departments) and the UK Cabinet Office to examine
embedding cybersecurity into undergraduate degrees in the
UK. Three workshops in 2013 and 2015 attempted to define
the principles of cybersecurity education and proposed a
framework for embedding these principles in UK computer
science curricula. Attendees at the workshops included in-
dustry, professional bodies, UK government departments and
more than 30 Universities that offer undergraduate computer
science degrees. This work initially lead to a white paper
related to a proposal in the form of a white paper [62],
followed by a set of guidelines [60]. The BCS agreed to adopt
the outputs into their accreditation criteria. This was the first
time that cybersecurity has been extensively referenced within
accreditation criteria for computing and IT-related degrees.
The fact that cybersecurity is included as a component of the
BCS accreditation criteria, reflects the importance placed on
cybersecurity and the expectation that all computing graduates
should have knowledge and skills in cybersecurity as they
move towards chartered status.
The produced reference guidelines (“Cybersecurity Prin-
ciples and Learning Outcomes”) [60] established a baseline
of common knowledge, example learning outcome domains
for cybersecurity within the computer science courses and
guidance on embedding the concepts. The document provides
specific guidance for embedding and enhancing relevant cy-
bersecurity principles, concepts and learning outcomes within
their undergraduate curricula. The document suggested 5 areas
of coverage
• Information and risk;
• Threats and attacks;
• Cybersecurity architecture and operations;
• Secure systems and products; and
• Cybersecurity management.
The ambition of this approach is to influence the curricula
of all programmes seeking accreditation (regardless of the
precise discipline area.) The approach taken is not intended
to be prescriptive or stifle innovation, however it is intended
to promote curricula that would benefit the students upon
programmes, their future employers and wider society. In
this context this is realised as an expectation cybersecurity
is an inclusion in all degrees accredited by the BCS. e.g. the
expectation for coverage is true for computer science as well
as cybersecurity programmes. Two criteria are expected to be
covered by all programmes seeking accreditation. These are
[14]:
2.1.6 Recognise the legal, social, ethical and professional
issues involved in the exploitation of computer technology and
be guided by the adoption of appropriate professional, ethical
and legal practices
2.1.9 Knowledge and understanding of information security
issues in relation to the design, development and the use of
information system
Additionally programmes seeking Chartered Information
Technology Professional (CITP) accreditation also have to
cover:
3.1.2 Knowledge and understanding of methods, techniques
and tools for information modelling, management and security
In the context of BCS accreditation, these requirements im-
ply an exit standard that all students on a programme must be
able to demonstrate irrespective of the option choices they have
made. This means an institution applying for accreditation
is expected to provide evidence that the criteria are taught
and assessed in a non-trivial manner, to and by all students
upon the programme seeking accreditation. An institution is
expected to provide evidence in the form of programme and
module specification documentation and example assessment
specifications (coursework and examinations). These criteria
and the expectation that they are taught and assessed has been
present for a number of years.
The BCS accreditation (2.1.6, 2.1.9 and 3.1.2) is not pre-
scriptive, but encourages institutions to embed cybersecurity
teaching across a range of subject areas in the computer
science curriculum such as programming, software design,
databases, networking, architecture. In addition there an ex-
pectation that there is significant coverage of cybersecurity
principles and fundamentals – either as a stand alone module
or as a significant component(s) of other modules. This ap-
proach differs from the ACM approach, where the expectations
are more explicit and the curriculum expectations are specified
at a more granular level.
B. What Are Universities Told?
The agreed Cybersecurity Principles and Learning Out-
come [60] were discussed with the wider education community
by a road-show led by CPHC. A series of workshops took
place in 2015 which presented the rationale for embedding
cybersecurity in the curriculum of computer science degrees.
The workshops included case studies from universities who
had embedded cybersecurity into their computer science cur-
ricula illustrating different approaches to implementation. The
workshops had 102 attendees from the academic computer
science community representing 60 UK Universities.
The BCS Guidelines on Course Accreditation are published
online [14]. The BCS also publishes the changes that have
been made [64]. When changes are made, the BCS commu-
nicates the changes by email and in writing to all the BCS
Educational Affiliates, that is all the institutions that seek
accreditation from the BCS. The expectations for cybersecurity
were extended in the June 2015 version of the guidelines
for consideration at accreditation visits that took place from
September 2015 or later.
This change to the accreditation guidelines is now in an
implementation period. The accreditation process adopted by
the BCS is cyclic in nature. Formally, the cycle is five years in
duration. The new expectations have been implemented as fol-
lows. To ensure continuous accreditation, accreditation visits
are normally scheduled every 5 years. At the time of the next
visit in this accreditation cycle, accreditation is conditional
upon an institution having considered the guidelines and either
adjusted the curriculum to meet the new expectations or have
a formal plan in place for when and how adjustments will
be made. It is anticipated that from 2020 the expectation will
be all accredited programmes have the new expectations fully
embedded.
In the year prior to an accreditation visit, institutions are
invited to a briefing from the BCS. The intention of the briefing
is to help ensure accreditation visits are successful from the
perspective of both the BCS and the institution. The briefings
take place virtually. The briefing includes a summary of the
process, discussion of recent changes, guidance regarding the
application and a summary of common issues that are being
seen in other institutions. Significant opportunity for seeking
clarification is provided. One of the issues that is highlighted
is not all institutions have yet evolved their programmes
to fully address the increased expectation for cybersecurity.
This is resulting in accreditation being contingent upon an
institution taking action to address this short fall or in some
cases the withdrawal of accreditation. A number of institutions
are in the process of adjusting their curricula to meet the
new expectations. In this case, the BCS notes the changes to
programme design, the outputs from which will be scrutinised
at the next accreditation visit.
C. Accreditation: What Progress Has Been Made?
This initiative is a collective attempt to formally include cy-
bersecurity in all BCS Accredited programmes. Some of these
programmes will be specialist cybersecurity programmes,
however the majority will take a different emphasis. This is a
work in progress. A full cycle of accreditation visits has not yet
taken place following the adjustment to the BCS Guidelines.
What is being observed is the majority of visited institutions
have now either adjusted their curricula to extend the coverage
of cybersecurity or have a plan in place to do so. However, a
minority are requiring encouragement to do so.
From the start of the Autumn 2015 term, up to and including
the Autumn 2018 term, the BCS have carried out 70 accred-
itation visits (including four international visits). The BCS
identified action was required to address concerns related to
cybersecurity at 16 institutions. So 54 institutions were already
delivering cybersecurity in keeping with the BCS expectations.
Long-term actions were expected from 12 institutions (six
in 2015/16, three in 2016/17 and three in Autumn 2018)
who were awarded ‘At Threshold’ judgments. Ten of these
judgments were across all programmes; one was specifically
against a generalist masters programme only. This indicates
that the BCS will expect adjustments to have taken place
before the next accreditation visit. As indicated earlier, this
was commonly the case that adjustments had been made to
approved programmes of study, however the adjusted modules
had not yet been delivered so the evidence base was incom-
plete in terms of how cybersecurity was assessed.
Short terms 90 Day Responses where required from four
institutions; the outcomes of these actions were as follows:
• Of the 11 UG programmes involved all were approved
‘At Threshold’;
• Of the 9 UG programmes involved, 8 were approved and
1 refused;
• Of the 5 UG programmes involved, all approved ‘At
Threshold’;
• Of the 3 UG programmes involved, all 3 were refused.
Good practice was identified at one university by the com-
mendation:
“The second year project provides an opportunity for
exploring security aspects in depth with an industrial
use case.”
In sum, this shows that many UK institutions have now
embedded cybersecurity in their provision, a number are in
the process of doing so and a minority have chosen not
to. Clearly not all institutions in the UK necessarily have
to apply for accreditation, or apply for accreditation for all
their programmes, but even so this is significant evidence of
inclusion of cybersecurity to an agreed standard.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The work presented in this paper is a first step towards better
understanding the nature, design, structure and assessment
of cybersecurity education in the UK, through the lens of
accreditation. It is clear that professional body accreditation
is having a positive effect on universities, supporting wider
national policy imperatives. It is also clear that there is a
significant need for mobilising the international computer
science academic community – alongside some of the existing
initiatives presented at the start of this paper – to continue this
focus on cybersecurity education, and provide international
comparators, portability and sharing of best practice.
As regards to the three research questions:
RQ1: What cybersecurity is taught and what cybersecurity
should be taught to the general computer science stu-
dents?
The guidelines from both ACM and BCS are good for
general education. However, the most important item
would seem to be an attitude of caution with respect to
both offline (§IV-B1) and online (§IV-B2) resources.
RQ2: Should cybersecurity be taught stand-alone or in an
integrated manner to general computer science students?
The recommendation in [26, p. 98] that cybersecurity
be taught largely through other Knowledge Areas is, in
abstract, a good idea. However, in the current state of
education resources (sections §IV-B) may be a counsel
caution in this approach. It is more important that issues
like SQL injection [44] or correct use of SSL/TLS [46]
be taught somewhere than that they not be taught at all.
Nevertheless, it is wrong for a complete curriculum to
ignore cybersecurity issues for example
• teach SQL without teaching SQL Injection [44];
• teach “web programming” without teaching Cross-Site
Scripting [42, (XSS)];
• ignore the impact of GDPR upon systems development;
• uncritically teach the use of Agile Development to
develop secure systems.
The BCS-identified good practice of exploring cybersecu-
rity via a project referencing Industry Standards, possibly
PCI DSS, is commended (§IV-A).
RQ3: Can accreditation by PSRBs enhance the provision of
cybersecurity within a body’s jurisdiction?
Accreditation (as practised by BCS in the UK) is a
valuable tool in improving the standard of cybersecurity
teaching, and disseminating good practice, and should
continue this. The time-lag in adoption of cybersecurity
in the US seems to be caused by the accreditation
differences more than any other factors.
We also have the following specific recommendations:
1) Database courses should look carefully at the security
aspects of the texts they use, and the examples they quote,
on the lines of [44].
2) Web Programming courses should do the same, with
emphasis on the avoidance of Cross-Site Scripting, and,
for production use, the use of a suitable framework11 that
has Cross-Site Request Forgery protection.
3) A study similar to [44] is recommended for future work
in Web Programming, Agile Development, Android De-
velopment and potentially other areas of the curriculum.
11Most modern frameworks do, but this is not often discussed
when looking at the advantages of frameworks. Even Mozilla’s tuto-
rial (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Learn/Server-side/First_steps/
Web_frameworks) is silent.
4) All computer science courses should emphasise that in-
formal resources should come with a “security health
warning”: see sections IV-B5 and IV-B2. One should
probably use the data from [46]: “If you pick up a
SSL/TLS answer from Stack Overflow, there’s a 70%
chance it’s insecure”.
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